By Tevita Motulalo
MSc Geopolitics and International Relations

“For weak states, security and national security is a product and reaction to the geopolitical and geophysical environment”

When the Hu‘akavameiliku Administration quietly established a “National Security and Intelligence Unit,” it looked at first like a bureaucratic step forward. But behind the paperwork, jargon, and foreign donor incentives was something far more dangerous—a silent coup against Tonga’s constitutional order.

There was no legislation. No Parliamentary debate. No Commission from His Majesty the King, who, under Tonga’s Constitution, is Commander-in-Chief and Head of State. As such, national security and foreign affairs are the exclusive prerogatives of the Crown, not matters to be tinkered with behind closed doors.

The existence, structure, and mandate of Tonga’s security services must emerge from the specific geopolitical and constitutional context of our Kingdom—not from donor agendas or imported frameworks. What has emerged instead is a shadow entity with unclear purpose, foreign entanglements, and no lawful grounding.

A Constitution Subverted

Tonga’s Constitution of 1875—among the oldest in the Pacific—places foreign policy, military command, and national security squarely under the authority of the Monarch. These are not ceremonial roles; they are guardrails forged through history, ensuring no single government can unilaterally wield coercive power without checks.

And yet, the Hu‘akavameiliku Cabinet bypassed all these. No Royal Commission. No legal instrument. No parliamentary scrutiny. In doing so, they have created a parallel power structure—one with the tools of surveillance and control, but no constitutional legitimacy. This is not “capacity building.” It is state capture by stealth.

Foreign Hands in Our Sovereignty

Let’s not feign ignorance. This was no accidental oversight. It aligns closely with regional trends where external powers—often through aid and training programs—are pushing Pacific nations to reshape their security apparatuses to suit strategic agendas. Tonga is simply the latest test case.

During the Cold War, the CIA and KGB funded shadow intelligence groups across Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa—many of which later turned on their own citizens. The PNG “Special Branch,” supported by Australia, became notorious for surveillance abuses during the Bougainville conflict. Even the Solomon Islands’ RAMSI intervention, while stabilising, subordinated local command of police and intelligence to Canberra’s control.

Foreign-funded security structures almost always end up answering to foreign interests.

The Eke Transfer: A False Fix

When Prime Minister Eke took office this year, responsibility for the unit was shifted to the Ministry of Police under Hon. Piveni Piukala. On paper, it may look like a correction. But in practice, it risks placing unregulated surveillance capabilities into the hands of a department already overwhelmed by the methamphetamine crisis and vulnerable to corruption.

Further compounding the issue, the Ministry then reportedly brought in foreign consultants with no credentials in security, geopolitics, or constitutional statecraft, further eroding credibility.

Security tools like interception technologies, surveillance software, and external training programs should never be deployed outside a lawful, transparent framework. Especially not through ministries that are already under public scrutiny for integrity lapses.